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We propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions.
Specifically, we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government
spending shock, while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock.
We explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects, i.e., that a current fiscal policy shock
changes fiscal policy variables in the future, but not at present.  We construct the impulse responses
to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks, corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit-spending,
deficit-financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion. We apply the method to US quarterly
data from 1955-2000.  We find that deficit-financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios
to improve GDP, with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional GDP per









What are the e®ects of tax cuts on the economy? How much does it matter whether
they are ¯nanced by corresponding cuts of expenditure or by corresponding increases
in government debt, compared to the no-tax-cut scenario? These questions are of key
importance to the science of economics and the practice of policy alike. This paper aims
to answer these questions by proposing and applying a new method of identifying ¯scal
policy surprises in vector autoregressions.
The identi¯cation method used in this paper is an extension of Uhlig (2005)'s ag-
nostic identi¯cation method of imposing sign restrictions on impulse response functions.
We extend this method to the identi¯cation of multiple fundamental shocks. More pre-
cisely, we identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock
by imposing sign restrictions on the ¯scal variables themselves as well as imposing or-
thogonality to a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock, which are
also identi¯ed with sign restrictions. No sign restrictions are imposed on the responses
of GDP, private consumption, private non-residential investment and real wages to ¯scal
policy shocks,and so the method remains agnostic with respect to the responses of the
key variables of interest.
The identi¯cation method is thereby able to address three main di±culties which
typically arise in the identi¯cation of ¯scal policy shocks in vector autoregressions. Firstly
there is the di±culty of distinguishing movements in ¯scal variables caused by ¯scal
policy shocks from those which are simply the automatic movements of ¯scal variables
in response to other shocks such as business cycle or monetary policy shocks. Secondly
there is the issue of what one means by a ¯scal policy shock. While there is agreement
that a monetary policy shock entails a surprise rise in interest rates, several competing
de¯nitions come to mind for ¯scal policy shocks. Finally one also needs to take account
of the fact that there is often a lag between the announcement and the implementation
of ¯scal policy and that the announcement may cause movements in macroeconomic
variables before there are movements in the ¯scal variables.
For the ¯rst problem we identify a business cycle shock and a monetary policy
shock and require that a ¯scal shock be orthogonal to both of them. This ¯lters out the
automatic responses of ¯scal variables to business cycle and monetary policy shocks.
To address the second problem, we argue that macroeconomic ¯scal policy shocks
exist in a two dimensional space spanned by two basic shocks, a government revenue
shock and a government spending shock. Di®erent ¯scal policies such as balanced budget
expansions can then be described as di®erent linear combinations of these two basic
shocks. For example a basic government spending shock is de¯ned as a shock where
government spending rises for a de¯ned period after the shock, and which is orthogonal to
1the business cycle shock and the monetary policy shock. We choose to restrict responses
for a year following the shock in order to rule out shocks where government spending
rises on impact but then subsequently falls after one or two quarters. This provides
additional identifying power.
For the third problem, we also identify ¯scal policy shocks with the the identi-
fying restriction that the ¯scal variable in question does not respond for four quarters,
and then rises for a de¯ned period afterwards. Restricting the responses of impulse re-
sponses as a means of identi¯cation is therefore particularly suitable for dealing with the
announcement e®ect.
This paper therefore contributes to the recent and growing literature of employing
vector autoregressions to analyze the impact of ¯scal policy shocks, complementing the
existing large literature analyzing monetary policy shocks, see e.g. Leeper, Sims and
Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Favero (2001) for excellent
surveys. Most of the previous literature has identi¯ed ¯scal shocks either by making
assumptions about the sluggish reaction of some variables to ¯scal policy shocks, see
for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b), Favero (2002),
and Gal¶ ³, L¶ opez-Salido, and Vall¶ es (2007) or by using additional information such as
the timing of wars, detailed institutional information about the tax system and detailed
historical study of policy decisions or elections, see for example Ramey and Shapiro
(1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burn-
side, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).1
By contrast this paper relies on macroeconomic time series data alone for shock
identi¯cation and does not rely on assumptions about the sluggish reaction of some
variables to macroeconomic shocks. Indeed it imposes no restrictions on the signs of
the responses of the key variables of interest - GDP, private consumption, private non-
residential investment and real wages - to ¯scal policy shocks. The approach of this
paper thus sharply di®erentiates it from previous studies and provides an important
complementary method of analysis which, being a purely vector autoregressive approach,
is automatically systematic and can be universally applied.
The method of identifying policy shocks using sign restrictions on impulse re-
sponses has been introduced and applied to monetary policy in Uhlig (2005). Uhlig's
method is extended here by imposing orthogonality restrictions to the business cycle and
monetary policy shocks as well as sign restrictions. Faust (1998) uses sign restrictions
1There are a wide variety of other empirical studies investigating the e®ects of ¯scal policy. The
focus of this paper is on the analysis of the e®ects of ¯scal policy using vector autoregressions and so
we do not attempt to summarize this literature here. For an excellent survey see Hemming, Kell and
Mahfouz (2000).
2to identify monetary policy shocks, imposing them only at the time of impact however
and Canova and De Nicolo (2002, 2003) and Canova and Pina (1998) identify mone-
tary shocks using sign restrictions on impulse response correlations. Canova and Pappa
(2006) also identify ¯scal shocks using sign restrictions on impulse response correlations
but control for monetary policy shocks by using data from economies (states and coun-
tries) belonging to monetary unions. More recently Dedola and Neri (2007) have used
sign restrictions to identify technology shocks and Mountford (2005), Peersman (2005),
Benati and Mumtaz (2007), Dungey and Fry (2007) and Fry and Pagan (2007) have
addressed the identi¯cation of multiple shocks using sign restrictions.
We apply our new approach to US quarterly data, from 1955 to 2000. We use
the same de¯nitions of government expenditure and revenue as Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) in order not to obscure the implications of our new methodological approach by
using di®erent data de¯nitions. We show that controlling for the business cycle shock is
important when analyzing the consequences of ¯scal policy. By linearly combining our
two base ¯scal policy shocks - i.e. the government revenue shock and the government
spending shock - , we analyze three policy scenarios: de¯cit-spending, de¯cit-¯nanced
tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion. Comparing these three scenarios,
we ¯nd that a surprise de¯cit-¯nanced tax cut is the best ¯scal policy to stimulate
the economy, giving rise to a maximal present value multiplier of ¯ve dollars of total
additional GDP per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue ¯ve years after
the shock. Furthermore, we ¯nd that de¯cit spending weakly stimulates the economy,
that it crowds out private investment without causing interest rates to rise, and that it
does not cause a rise in real wages.
Despite the novel methodology developed in this paper, the results are reasonably
similar to those of the existing literature. As with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we
¯nd that investment falls in response to both tax increases and government spending
increases and that the multipliers associated with a change in taxes to be much higher
than those associated with changes in spending. This latter results also accords with the
analysis of Romer and Romer (2007) who ¯nd large e®ects from exogenous tax changes.
With regard to private consumption we ¯nd, in common with Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Gal¶ ³, L¶ opez-Salido, and Vall¶ es (2004), that consumption does not fall in
response to an unexpected increase in government spending. However, in contrast to
these studies we do not ¯nd that consumption rises strongly. Our results show that the
response of consumption is small and only signi¯cantly di®erent from zero on impact
and are thus more in line with those of Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) who
¯nd that private consumption does not change signi¯cantly in response to a positive
3spending shock.2 Finally we ¯nd that real wages do not rise in response to an increase
in government spending and have a negative response on impact and at longer horizons.
Thus the responses of investment, consumption and real wages to a government spending
shock are di±cult to reconcile with the standard Keynesian approach although they are
also not the responses predicted by the benchmark real business cycle model either.
As an open issue for future research, we leave the question as to how far the
responses calculated here are consistent with general equilibrium modelling, or whether
additional restrictions from general equilibrium modelling ought to be imposed during
estimation. Chung and Leeper (2007) have recently pointed out that long-run budget
balance needs to hold and that this implies restrictions on the VAR coe±cients. Put
di®erently, it ought to be obvious that one cannot forever stimulate the economy with
de¯cit-¯nanced tax cuts: they eventually need to be repaid. We agree with Chung and
Leeper that this issue is important and merits further attention.
The paper is comprised of three main sections. Section 2 describes the identi¯cation
procedure and the VAR. The empirically identi¯ed basic shocks are presented in section 3,
while section 4 conducts policy analysis and compares the results with those of the
existing literature in section 4.6. The appendix contains additional detail, in particular
on the VAR framework and the sign restriction methodology as well as describing the
data sources.
2 Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks
A ¯scal policy shock is a surprise change in ¯scal policy. However, there is no such
thing as a ¯scal policy shock per se. Fiscal policy encompasses a wide variety of policies:
there is an endless list of types of incomes, for which the tax rules could be changed, or
categories of government spending, where changes could occur. In this paper we address
the much broader and traditional `macro'-economic issue of the e®ects on the aggregate
economy of aggregate ¯scal variables. Even so there still remain a large set of possible
policies since changes in ¯scal policy could, for example, be about changing the tax-debt
mix for ¯nancing a given stream of government spending, or about changing the level of
spending for a given level of debt.
In this paper we view ¯scal policy shocks as existing in a two dimensional space
spanned by two basic impulse vectors, a government revenue shock and a government
2Theoretical explanations for why consumption does not fall in response to a government spending
shock in an in¯nite horizon framework are given by Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996), in a model
with increasing returns to scale and Gal¶ ³, L¶ opez-Salido, and Vall¶ es (2007) in a model with both sticky
prices and "Non-Ricardian" agents.
4spending shock. We identify each of these basic ¯scal policy shocks by imposing a positive
reaction of the impulse response of the appropriate ¯scal variable - i.e. government
revenue or government spending - for quarters k = 0;:::;3 following the shock and by
requiring it to be orthogonal to a business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock,
which in turn are also identi¯ed using sign restrictions. If we would not control for
the state of the business cycle, it would be easy to end up confusing, for example, an
increase in government receipts due to a business cycle upturn with an upturn "caused"
by a tax increase. Note that we do not require the two ¯scal policy shocks to be mutually
orthogonal.
Rather than simultaneously identifying all three (or all four) shocks, subject to the
orthogonality restrictions, we ¯rst identify the business cycle shock and monetary policy
shock via a criterion function based on the sign restrictions, thus ascribing as much
movements as possible to these shocks. The ¯scal shocks are then identi¯ed via sign
restrictions as well as the orthogonality restrictions. This procedure may be reminiscent
of a causal ordering. If the criterion function was linear, one could linearly recombine
the variables such that the ¯rst variable now corresponds to that linear combination
of the criterion function: a Cholesky decomposition would then make the ¯rst shock
explain as much as possible of the one-step ahead prediction error in that ¯rst variable,
thus maximizing the criterion function. Since our criterion function is nonlinear and
involves the impulse responses for several periods, one could not rewrite the problem in
this manner, but the analogy may still be helpful to understand the procedure and the
results.
A further thorny and well-understood challenge when identifying ¯scal policy
shocks is the problem of the possible lag between the announcement and implemen-
tation of changes in ¯scal policy. Considering the potentially lengthy debates in legis-
latures about, say, a reduction in tax rates, the change in government revenue is fairly
predictable by the time the tax reduction actually takes e®ect. Forward-looking individ-
uals and ¯rms can adjust their economic choices before that date. While the tax change
will happen eventually, the surprise of a change in ¯scal policy occurs earlier. Our iden-
ti¯cation procedure is easily adapted to deal with this problem by directly identifying a
shock for which there is a lag between the announcement and the implementation of the
change in ¯scal policy. In particular, we shall identify announced ¯scal policy shocks,
where government spending only rises in the fourth quarter following the shock but shows
no reaction beforehand.3
Given the two basic ¯scal shocks, di®erent ¯scal policy scenarios can be described
3In this respect the identi¯ed shocks resemble a type of `news shock' about ¯scal policy and so are
related to the shocks identi¯ed by Beaudry and Portier (2003).
5as sequences of di®erent linear combinations of these two basic shocks. For example,
we will de¯ne a balanced budget expansionary ¯scal scenario as a sequence of a linear
combination of the two basic shocks such that the increase in government spending is
matched by the increase in tax revenue for a sequence of ¯ve quarters, k = 0;:::;5,
following the initial shock.
2.1 The VAR and Identifying Restrictions
We use a VAR in GDP, private consumption, total government expenditure, total gov-
ernment revenue, real wages, private non-residential investment, interest rate, adjusted
reserves, the producer price index for crude materials and the GDP de°ator. The VAR
system consists of these 10 variables at a quarterly frequency from 1955 to 2000, has
6 lags, no constant or a time trend, and uses the logarithm for all variables except the
interest rate where we have used the level. The chosen approach largely dictates the
choice of these variables. GDP, private consumption, private investment and real wages
are included as the focus of interest. Private consumption is also included because the
consumption-GDP ratio has predictive value for GDP, as Cochrane (1994) has shown.
Real wages are also included as Neoclassical and New Keynesian models tend to predict
di®erent signs for the responses of real wages to de¯cit spending shocks, with the former
predicting negative and the latter positive responses, see Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
The monetary and price variables are there to identify monetary policy shocks. All the
components of national income are in real per capita terms. A more detailed description
can be found in Appendix B.
The two ¯scal variables in the VAR are de¯ned in the same way as in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). Thus total government expenditure is total government consumption
plus total government investment and total government revenues is total government tax
revenues minus transfers. Netting out transfer payments from the government revenue
variable is a non-trivial decision, but we have chosen to use Blanchard and Perotti's
(2002) data de¯nitions in order to emphasize the implications of the new identi¯cation
technique rather than have the results obscured by using di®erent data de¯nitions.
2.2 The identifying assumptions in detail.
An overview of our identifying sign restrictions on the impulse responses is provided
in Table 1. A business cycle shock is de¯ned as a shock which jointly moves output,
consumption, non-residential investment and government revenue in the same direction
for four quarters following the shock. Since we associate business cycles with the more
substantial movements in these variables, we identify the business cycle shock by a
6TABLE 1
IDENTIFYING SIGN RESTRICTIONS
Gov. Gov GDP, Cons, Interest Adjusted Prices
Revenue Spending Non-Res Inv Rate Reserves
Non-Fiscal Shocks
Business Cycle + +
Monetary Policy + - -
Basic Fiscal Policy Shocks
Government Revenue +
Government Spending +
This table shows the sign restrictions on the impulse responses for each identi¯ed shock. `Cons' stands
for Private Consumption and `Non-Res Inv' stands for Non-Residential Investment. A "+" means that
the impulse response of the variable in question is restricted to be positive for four quarters following
the shock, including the quarter of impact. Likewise, a "-" indicates a negative response. A blank entry
indicates, that no restrictions have been imposed.
criterion function, which rewards large impulse responses in the right directions more
than small responses and penalizes responses of the wrong sign.
Such a co-movement is consistent with both demand and supply side shocks and
hence the approach remains `agnostic' on the issue of the determinants of business cycle
°uctuations. The restriction that government revenues increase with output in the busi-
ness cycle shock should be emphasized. This is our crucial identifying assumption for
¯scal policy shocks: when output and government revenues move in the same direction,
we essentially assume that this must be due to some improvement in the business cycle
generating the increase in government revenue, not the other way around. We regard this
is a reasonable assumption and consistent with a number of theoretical views. Further-
more, our identifying assumptions are close to minimal: some assumptions are needed
to say anything at all. The orthogonality assumption a priori excludes the view that
positive co-movements of government revenues and output are caused by some form of
short term `La®er Curve' or '¯scal consolidation' e®ect from a surprise rise in taxes.4
A monetary policy shock moves interest rates up and reserves and prices down for
4The `La®er Curve' is a phenomenon which, if it exists, may be expected to operate over the medium
term and so would not be ruled out by the short run sign restrictions imposed. Indeed Figure 11 shows
that the responses of government revenue in response to a tax cut can be positive in the medium term.
7four quarters after the shock. These identifying restrictions are close to those used in
Uhlig (2005). We also require the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the busi-
ness cycle shock. The main purpose of characterizing the business cycle and monetary
shocks is to ¯lter out the e®ects of these shocks on the ¯scal variables. The additional
orthogonalization among these two shocks has no e®ect on that.
Fiscal policy shocks are identi¯ed only through restricting the impulse responses
of the ¯scal variables and through the requirement that they are orthogonal to both
business cycle shocks as well as monetary policy shocks. As stated above we identify
two basic ¯scal shocks, a "government spending shock" and a "government revenue
shock", employing tight identifying restrictions where the responses of the ¯scal variables
are restricted for a year after shock. For example a basic government spending shock
is de¯ned as a shock where government spending rises for a de¯ned period after the
shock. These tight restrictions are designed to rule out very transitory shocks to ¯scal
variables where for example, government spending rises on impact but falls after one
or two quarters. Nonetheless we have checked that our results are robust to weaker
identifying restrictions where responses are only restricted on impact. Finally it should
be noted that we do not restrict the behavior of government revenue when identifying
the government spending shock or vice versa. This is not necessary since all that is
required to describe the two dimensional space of ¯scal policy shocks are two linearly
independent vectors. However it is possible to place restrictions on these shocks so that
for example government revenue's response to a government spending shock is initially
zero. An example of such restrictions are the year delayed ¯scal shocks in Figures 5 and
8 where ¯scal responses are restricted to be zero for a year following the announcement
of the shock.
Details on the estimation as well as on the implementation of the identi¯cation
strategies, including these zero restrictions, are described in Appendix A and in Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2002).
3 Results
The identi¯ed fundamental shocks for each time period are displayed in Figure 1. The
shocks are identi¯ed for each draw from the posterior and the 16th, 50th and 84th
quantiles plotted. The impulse responses for these fundamental shocks are shown in
Figures 2 through 9, where we have plotted the impulse responses of all our 10 variables
to the shocks. The Figures plot the 16th, 50th and 84th quantiles of these impulse
See Trabandt and Uhlig (2007) and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1990, 2000) and Perotti (1999) for
analysis on this issue.
8responses, calculated at each horizon between 0 and 24 quarters after the shocks. The
impulses restricted by the identifying sign restrictions are identi¯ed by the shaded area
in the ¯gures.
3.1 The Business Cycle Shock
The identi¯ed business cycle shocks are plotted in the ¯rst panel of Figure 1 where the
NBER recession dates are shaded. The identi¯ed shocks correspond well with the NBER
dates, with the only anomalies being the 1981-82 recession, which is not picked up, and
the short 1990-91 recession which doesn't appear to be very di®erent in scale from other
clusters of negative shocks.
The impulse responses of the business cycle shock are plotted in Figure 2. In
response to the business cycle shock, output, consumption, non-residential investment
and government revenue increase in the ¯rst four quarters by construction. Given that
no restriction is placed on these responses after four periods, it is notable that all of these
responses are persistent. Government revenues increase approximately twice as much in
percentage terms as GDP. There is no contradiction here, provided marginal tax rates are
approximately twice average tax rates. The persistence in the non-residential investment
variable indicates that a business cycle shock may increase the steady state capital to
labor ratio and so generate a higher level of steady state income, consumption and
government revenue. It must be stressed that these responses are consistent with both
demand and supply side explanations of the business cycle and this paper is agnostic on
the issue of the relative importance and persistence of demand and supply shocks.
The responses of the monetary variables and the government spending variable
to the business cycle shock were not restricted at all by the identi¯cation method and
their responses are quite interesting. The interest rate rises and the adjusted reserves
fall in response to a positive business cycle shock. This could be caused by a systematic
counter-cyclical response of monetary policy over the sample period, which ¯ts with the
description of monetary policy given by Romer and Romer (1994). The fall in adjusted
reserves (compared to the no-business-cycle-shock scenario) would indicate that this
counter-cyclical response is rather strong.
Government expenditures in contrast do not behave in a counter-cyclical fashion.
Rather they increase, slowly, with a positive business cycle shock. Thus if a business
cycle boom ¯lls the government's co®ers with cash, it will spend more eventually. Note
again that, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we chose the government expendi-
ture variable to be government consumption and investment in order to isolate changes
in government expenditure from automatic changes over the business cycle. Thus the
9government expenditure variable does not include transfer payments which almost surely
would automatically vary counter-cyclically.
3.2 The Monetary Policy Shock
The identi¯ed monetary policy shocks are plotted in the second panel of Figure 1. Again
these identi¯ed shocks correspond well with the existing literature, such as Bernanke and
Mihov's (1998) plot of monetary policy stance, and are on average negative (indicating
a loose policy stance) in the late 1970's, positive (indicating a tight policy stance) in the
early 1980's, as well as being more volatile in the Volcker experiment period 1979-82.
The response to a monetary policy shock is shown in Figure 3. Note that we have
constructed the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the business cycle shock shown
in Figure 2. Thus this shock represents that part of the unanticipated quarterly change
in monetary policy that is not accounted for by systematic responses over the quarter to
unanticipated business cycle shocks. A consequence of our identi¯cation strategy is that
if, rather counter-intuitively, monetary policy shocks should be such that surprise rises
in the interest rate cause short term increases in output, consumption and investment,
then these e®ects would be captured by the business cycle shock shown in Figure 2,
not by the monetary shock shown here. Thus, output, consumption and investment in
Figure 3, have a propensity to fall in the short term almost by construction and they do,
although interestingly by very little. Over the medium term monetary policy shocks are
associated with a marginally lower interest rate and increases in income, consumption,
and wages. These results are thus not inconsistent with the ¯ndings in Uhlig (2005):
there, without orthogonality to the business cycle shock, sign restriction methods do not
deliver a clear direction for real GDP in response to a surprise rise in interest rates.
What is a little surprising is the rise in government revenue in response to the
rise in interest rates. One plausible, although not the only, explanation for this is that
over the sample period, monetary and ¯scal policy was coordinated so that a monetary
tightening was accompanied by a ¯scal tightening via an increase in taxes. If this were
the case then there would be a danger that requiring ¯scal shocks to be orthogonal to
monetary policy shocks will cause biases in the results. For this reason we have checked
the robustness of our identi¯ed ¯scal shocks by identifying them both second (orthogonal
to only the business cycle shock) and third (orthogonal to both the business cycle and
monetary policy shocks). We ¯nd that the responses of the real variables are very similar
in both these speci¯cations and hence any bias is small. This may be because monetary
policy shocks do not appear have a large e®ect on real macroeconomic variables. We
conclude from this, that controlling for the monetary policy shock is not important when
10analyzing the consequences of ¯scal policy, see Mountford and Uhlig (2002) for a greater
discussion of this issue.
3.3 The Basic Government Revenue Shock
A basic government revenue shock is identi¯ed as a shock that is orthogonal to the
business cycle and monetary policy shock and where government revenue rises for a
year after the shock. The identi¯ed government revenue shocks are plotted in the third
panel of Figure 1 where the change from shaded to non-shaded areas denote changes in
presidential terms. These identi¯ed shocks correspond, in part at least, with Romer and
Romer's (2007) measure of exogenous tax changes, in that the shocks are on average
negative in the mid-1960's and mid 1980's and positive in the early 1990's. They also
clearly pick up the large e®ects of the 1975 Tax Reduction Act.
The impulse responses for this shock are displayed in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows
that the responses of the real variables of interest to a standard government revenue
shock are intuitive. GDP, consumption and investment fall in response to an increase
in revenue and real wages also fall although with a lag. The responses of interest rates
and prices are less intuitive as interest rates rise and reserves fall in response to a rise
in revenue. Although no restriction is placed on the behavior of government spending
for this shock, government spending follows the shape of the GDP and consumption
responses and falls before recovering.
3.4 The Anticipated Government Revenue Shock
We also identify a year delayed shock where government revenue is restricted to rise only
after a year. The responses of this shock are displayed in Figure 5. They show an intuitive
`announcement e®ect' as the anticipated rise in revenues immediately depresses output
and consumption. This accords with our intuition regarding the optimal smoothing
behavior of individuals and ¯rms. Interest rates also fall with this drop in output which
is also intuitive.
The median responses of the unanticipated and anticipated shocks are compared
in Figure 6 where the responses of the unanticipated shocks are shifted forward so that
the implementation of the revenue shock is in the same time period. Figure 6 shows
that the responses to an anticipated government revenue shock, while similar to those of
the unanticipated shocks in terms of their sign, are somewhat smaller, perhaps because
announced policies move ¯scal variables by less than unanticipated changes.5
5Changes in ¯scal policy may be the result of the systematic component of ¯scal policy - unrelated
113.5 The Basic Government Spending Shock
A basic government revenue shock is identi¯ed as a shock that is orthogonal to the
business cycle and monetary policy shock and where government spending rises for a
year after the shock. The identi¯ed government spending shocks are plotted in the fourth
panel of Figure 1 where the change from shaded to non-shaded areas denote changes in
presidential terms. These identi¯ed shocks show that government spending shocks were
predominantly positive in the mid 1960's and early 1990's and predominantly negative
around 1960 and in the early 1970's. In the the 1990's government spending appears to
be more stable than average with relatively few shocks reaching the 2.5 percent level in
absolute terms.
The impulse responses for this shock are displayed in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows
that the basic government spending shock stimulates output during the ¯rst four quarters
although only weakly and has only a very weak e®ect on private consumption. It also
reduces investment, although interestingly not via higher interest rates. Real wages do
not respond positively to the government spending shock and indeed are negative on
impact and in the medium term which is more in accordance with neoclassical than New
keynesian models of government spending, see Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Although
no restriction is placed on the behavior of government revenue this does not change
very signi¯cantly and so the basic government spending shock will resemble a ¯scal
policy shock of de¯cit spending, whose responses are displayed in Figure 10 in section 4
below. The response of prices to the increase in government spending is a little puzzling
since both the GDP de°ator and the producer price index for crude materials show a
decline. Although this is a counter-intuitive result, it should also be noted that this
negative relationship between prices and government spending has also been found in
other studies, see for example Canova and Pappa (2003), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (1999) and Fat¶ as, and Mihov (2001a).
3.6 The Anticipated Government Spending Shock
We also identify a year delayed shock where government spending is restricted to rise
only after a year. The responses of this shock are displayed in Figure 8. They again
show an intuitive `announcement' e®ect on impact as the anticipated rise in spending
immediately has a positive e®ect on output and interest rates. Again this is consistent
with smoothing behavior by individuals and ¯rms. The median responses of the unan-
to the business cycle - rather ¯scal policy shocks, as Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2007) have argued is the
case for monetary policy shocks. However we leave the joint identi¯cation of ¯scal policy regime shifts
and ¯scal policy shock for future work.
12ticipated and anticipated shocks are compared in Figure 9 where the responses of the
unanticipated shocks are shifted forward so that the implementation of the spending
shock is in the same time period. Figure 9 shows that the responses to an anticipated
government spending shock appear more persistent and stronger than for the unantici-
pated shocks and investment is no longer crowded out by the increased in government
spending. This is an interesting and slightly puzzling result, however it should be noted
that the interpretation of these responses in the medium term is clouded by the marginal
cut in taxes after a year. From Figure 5 this would have a signi¯cant expansionary e®ect
and this may be the cause of the persistent positive e®ects on income and consumption.
In section 4.1 below we demonstrate a straightforward method for accounting for such
changes when performing policy analysis.
4 Policy Analysis
We can use the basic shocks identi¯ed in the previous section to analyze the e®ects of
di®erent ¯scal policies. We view di®erent ¯scal policy shocks as di®erent linear combina-
tions of the basic ¯scal policy shocks. There are clearly a huge number of possible ¯scal
policies we could analyze so here we restrict ourselves to comparing three popularly an-
alyzed ¯scal policies. A de¯cit spending shock, a de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut and a balanced
budget spending shock. We ¯rst detail how the impulse responses for these policies are
generated
4.1 Calculating the Impulse Responses for Di®erent Fiscal Pol-
icy Scenarios
Our methodology regards di®erent ¯scal policy scenarios as being di®erent combinations
of the two basic shocks over a sequence of several quarters. For example, a government
spending scenario where government spending is raised by 1% for four quarters while
government revenue remains unchanged is the linear combination of the sequence of the
two basic shocks that generates these responses in the ¯scal variables as the combined
impulse response. More formally denoting rj;a(k) as the response at horizon k of variable








(rGR;BGS(k ¡ j)BGSj + rGR;BGR(k ¡ j)BGRj) for k = 0;:::K
where K = 4, GS and GR stand for Government Expenditure and Government Revenue
and BGSj,and BGRj are respectively the scale of the standard basic government spending
and revenue shocks in period j.
We analyze three key policy scenarios below: de¯cit spending, a de¯cit-¯nanced
tax cut and a balanced budget spending expansion. It should be clear, however, that
other scenarios of interest can be analyzed in this manner as well.
4.2 A De¯cit Spending Fiscal Policy Scenario
The impulse responses for a de¯cit spending ¯scal policy scenario are shown in Figure 10.
The policy scenario is designed as a sequence of basic ¯scal shocks such that government
spending rises by 1% and tax revenues remain unchanged for four quarters following the
initial shock. As noted above the standard basic government spending shock does not
change tax revenues signi¯cantly so the impulses in Figure 10 and are similar to those in
Figure 7. Thus the de¯cit spending scenario stimulates output and consumption during
the ¯rst four quarters although only weakly, it reduces non-residential investment and it
produces a counterintuitive response for prices.
4.3 A De¯cit Financed Tax Cut Fiscal Policy Scenario
The impulse responses for a de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut ¯scal policy scenario are shown in
Figure 11. The policy scenario is designed as a sequence of basic ¯scal shocks such that
tax revenues fall by 1% and government spending remains unchanged for four quarters
(including the initial quarter) following the initial shock. The responses look very similar
to a mirror image of the responses to the basic government revenue shock in Figure 4.
Thus the tax cut stimulates output, consumption and investment signi¯cantly with the
e®ect peaking after about three years. The e®ect on prices is initially negative but
subsequently positive following the rise in output.
4.4 The Balanced Budget Spending Policy Scenario
The balanced budget spending policy scenario is identi¯ed by requiring both government
revenues and expenditures to increase in such a way that the increase in revenues and ex-
penditure are equal for each period in the four-quarter window following the initial shock.
For ease of comparison we choose a sequence of basic ¯scal shocks such that government
14TABLE 2
PRESENT VALUE MULTIPLIERS OF THE POLICY SCENARIOS
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
DEFICIT FINANCED TAX CUT 0.29 0.51 1.43 3.99 -4.98 5.33 (qrt 14)
DEFICIT SPENDING 0.65 0.46 0.12 -0.22 -0.97 0.65 (qrt 1)
This table shows the present value multipliers for a de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut policy scenario and for a
de¯cit spending ¯scal policy scenario. The multipliers given are the median multipliers in both cases.
spending rises by 1% and government revenues rises by 1:28%. Government revenue rises
by more than government spending since over the sample government revenue's share of
GDP is 0:162 while that of government spending is 0:208 thus we require government
revenues to rise by (0:208=0:162)%. The results are shown in Figure 12. These show
that on impact there is a small expansionary e®ect on GDP but thereafter the depressing
e®ects of the tax increases dominate the spending e®ects and GDP, consumption and
investment fall.
4.5 Measures of the E®ects of Policy Scenarios
To compare the e®ects of one ¯scal scenario with another it is useful to de¯ne summary
measures of the e®ects of each ¯scal scenario. One measure used in the literature is
the ratio of the response of GDP at a given period to the initial movement of the ¯scal
variable, see for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Canova and Pappa (2003).
We refer to this as the impact multiplier. We report the impact multipliers of the de¯cit
¯nanced tax cut and de¯cit spending policy scenarios below in Tables 3 and 4.
However we also think a measure of the impact of a scenario along the entire path
of the responses up to a given period is also useful. In Figure 13 we have therefore plotted
the present value of the impulse responses of GDP and the ¯scal variables for the de¯cit
¯nanced tax cut and the de¯cit spending policy scenarios. We have also calculated a
present value multiplier for these scenarios which we display in Table 2. To calculate the
present value multiplier we use the following formula.







where yj is the response of GDP at period j, fj is the response of the ¯scal variable at
15period j, i is the average interest rate over the sample, and f=y is the average share of
the ¯scal variable in GDP over the sample. We use the median multiplier in all cases.
Table 2 and Figure 13 and tell the same story. They show that in present value
terms tax cuts have a much greater e®ect on GDP than government spending. The
present value of the GDP response to a de¯cit spending scenario becomes insigni¯cant
after two years whereas that for the de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut is signi¯cantly positive
throughout. Figure 13 also shows that the standard error of the present value multiplier
becomes very large for the de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut at later time periods.6
4.6 Comparison of Results With The Existing Literature
Despite the novel methodology used in this paper, there are many similarities to results
obtained elsewhere in the existing literature. There are however also important di®er-
ences which we shall discuss below. As we have used Blanchard and Perotti's (2002)
data de¯nitions for the ¯scal variables and use a very similar sample period it is nat-
ural to compare our results most closely with their paper. We do this in the following
subsection. We compare our results to other studies in a further subsection.
4.6.1 Comparison With Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
The impact multipliers, de¯ned above, are compared with those of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) in Tables 3 and 4.
For the de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut, Table 3 shows that our results are very comparable
with Blanchard and Perotti's. In both studies the e®ect on output of a change in tax
revenues is persistent and large. The size of the impact multiplier is greater in our results
than in Blanchard and Perotti's although in both studies the impact multipliers of the
tax cut scenario are greater than those of the spending scenario.
For the spending scenario, Table 4 shows that size of the impact multipliers as-
sociated with increased government spending are smaller than Blanchard and Perotti's,
but that the timing has a similar pattern in the sense that the largest impact multipliers
are in the periods close to the impact of the initial shock and with the responses after a
year being insigni¯cant.
With respect to the responses of investment again the two studies are similar. In
both Blanchard and Perotti's and in our study investment falls in response to both tax
increases and government spending increases. With regard to consumption the results
have some similarities to Blanchard and Perotti's in that consumption does not fall in
6The median multiplier becomes negative at later time periods for both the de¯cit spending and
de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut shocks but in both cases these negative multipliers are not signi¯cant.
16TABLE 3
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF DEFICIT FINANCED TAX CUT POLICY SCENARIOS
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
Mountford and Uhlig
GDP 0.28 0.93 2.05 3.41 2.59 3.57 (qrt 13)
TAX REVENUES -1.00 -1.00 0.06 1.05 1.03
GOV SPENDING 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.43 0.48
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
GDP 0.70 1.07 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.33 (qrt 7)
TAX REVENUES -0.74 -0.31 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
GOV SPENDING 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.20
This table shows the impact multipliers for a de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut ¯scal scenario for various quar-
ters after the initial shock and compares them to similar measures from Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
Table III. The multiplier represents the e®ect in dollars of a one dollar cut in taxes at the ¯rst quar-
ter. For the Mountford and Uhlig results this is calculated with the formula: multiplier for GDP
= GDP response
Initial Fiscal shock=(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP), where the median responses are used
in all cases. On the calculation of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) multipliers see Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) section V.
response to a spending shock. However in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) consumption
rises signi¯cantly in response to a spending shock whereas in our analysis consumption
does not move by very much.7 As Figure 10 shows consumption's response is only
signi¯cantly positive on impact and then by only a small amount. Thereafter its response
is insigni¯cant. Finally we ¯nd that real wages do not rise in response to an increase
in government spending and have a negative response on impact and at longer horizons.
Thus taken together these ¯ndings are di±cult to reconcile with the standard Keynesian
approach although they also not the responses predcited by the benchmark real business
cycle model.
7See also Gal¶ ³, L¶ opez-Salido, and Vall¶ es (2007) who also ¯nd a signi¯cantly positive consumption
response.
17TABLE 4
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF A DEFICIT SPENDING POLICY SCENARIO
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
Mountford and Uhlig
GDP 0.65 0.27 -0.74 -1.19 -2.24 0.65 (qrt 1)
GOV SPENDING 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.37 -0.32
TAX REVENUES 0.00 0.00 -0.33 -0.87 -2.04
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
GDP 0.90 0.55 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.90 (qrt 1)
GOV. SPENDING 1.00 1.30 1.56 1.61 1.62
TAX REVENUES 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.36 0.37
This table shows the impact multipliers for a de¯cit spending ¯scal scenario for various quarters after
the initial shock and compares them to similar measures from Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Table
IV. The multiplier represents the e®ect in dollars of a one dollar increase in spending at the ¯rst
quarter. For the Mountford and Uhlig results this is calculated with the formula: multiplier for GDP
= GDP response
Initial Fiscal shock=(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP), where the median responses are used
in all cases. On the calculation of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) multipliers see Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) section V.
4.6.2 Comparison With Other Studies
With regard to other studies in the literature not only are there di®erences in method-
ology but also in the de¯nitions of the ¯scal variables. There is thus no shortage of
potential sources for di®erences in results. Nevertheless there is still some common
ground in the results of this paper and previous work. For example consider the recent
work by Burnside,Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) which builds on the work of Ramey
and Shapiro (1998), and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) in using changes in
military purchases associated with various wars to identify government spending shock.
They ¯nd that private consumption does not change signi¯cantly in response to a gov-
ernment spending shock. However in contrast to our results they ¯nd that investment
has an initial, transitory positive response to the spending shock.
18TABLE 5
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF FISCAL POLICY SCENARIOS
Fiscal Scenario Maximum Multiplier Minimum Multiplier
Median Con¯dence Interval Median Con¯dence Interval
Multiplier 16th,84th Quantiles Multiplier 16th,84th Quantiles
De¯cit Spending 0.91 0.68, 1.37 -2.88 -4.99, -0.80
lag 4 lag 2, lag 6 at lag 20 lag 24, lag 8
Balanced Budget 0.47 0.19, 0.84 -5.84 -9.46, -3.63
lag 1 lag 1, lag 1 at lag 19 lag 15, lag 11
Tax Cut 3.81 2.58, 5.49 0.19 -0.11, 0.36
lag 12 lag 15, lag 13 at lag 24 lag 24, lag 1
De¯cit Spending 0.79 0.59, 1.05 0.09 -0.21, 0.31
In ¯rst year lag 4 lag 4, lag 1 at lag 4 lag 4, lag 2
Balanced Budget 0.45 0.16, 0.79 -0.71 -1.11, -0.40
In ¯rst year at lag 3 lag 1, lag 1 at lag 4 lag 1, lag 2
These statistics relate to the distribution of the maximum and minimum impact multiplier ef-
fects of each ¯scal scenario. For each draw the maximum and minimum ¯scal multiplier is cal-
culated and the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles of these results are displayed. The multiplier
statistic is calculated in terms of the initial, lag 0, ¯scal shock as follows: multiplier for GDP
= GDP response
Fiscal shock at Lag 0=(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP).
4.7 Variance of the Policy Analysis
Clearly there is a considerable degree of uncertainty in the numbers displayed in Tables 3
and 4, as they are based on the maximum multipliers from the median impulse responses.
An advantage of the Bayesian approach used in our analysis is that it naturally provides
a measure of the standard errors for this policy analysis. Standard errors can easily be
calculated for each policy scenario by taking the maximum and minimum multipliers of
GDP and their corresponding lag for each of the draws from the posterior. These maxima
and minima can then be ordered and the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles reported. This
is done in Table 5.
Table 5 supports the conclusions above. The maximum expansionary e®ect of
a de¯cit spending scenario is much below that of the tax revenue scenario. Indeed the
19upper con¯dence limit of the de¯cit spending scenario is below the lower con¯dence limit
of the tax cut scenario. For the tax cut the maximum e®ects are signi¯cantly positive
and the minimum e®ects are insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero.
The results in Table 5 are usefully related to the impulse responses in Figures 10
through 12. For the tax cut the maximum multipliers occur after two or more years,
whereas for the balanced budget and de¯cit spending scenarios the maximum e®ects
occur at short lags and the minimum e®ects at longer lags. Since the variance of the
impulse responses for these scenarios appears to increase at longer lag lengths, we also
look at the maximum and minimum multipliers of the two spending scenarios in the
¯rst year after the initial shock. In this case we now get the result that the de¯cit
spending scenario's minimum multiplier is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero but that for
the balanced budget spending scenario is still signi¯cantly negative.
4.8 Policy Conclusions
An important lesson one can draw from the results is that while a de¯cit-¯nanced ex-
penditure stimulus is possible, the eventual costs are likely to be much higher than the
immediate bene¯ts. For suppose that government spending is increased by two percent,
¯nanced by increasing the de¯cit: this results, using the median values from Table 5, at
maximum, in less than a two percent increase in GDP. But the increased de¯cit needs
to be repaid eventually with a hike in taxes. Even ignoring compounded interest rates,
this would require a tax hike of over two percent.8 This tax hike results in a greater than
seven percent drop in GDP. Thus unless the policy maker's discount rate is very high
the costs of the expansion will be much higher than the initial bene¯t.
This general line of reasoning is consistent with the balanced budget spending
scenario whose impulses are shown in Figure 12. This shows that when government
spending is ¯nanced contemporaneously that the contractionary e®ects of the tax in-
creases outweigh the expansionary e®ects of the increased expenditure after a very short
time.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a new approach for distinguishing the e®ects of ¯scal
policy shocks by adapting the method of Uhlig (2005). This method uses only the in-
formation in the macroeconomic time series of the vector autoregression together with
8For simplicity we are assuming the tax hike to be a surprise, when it occurs, which allows us to use
the results above.
20minimal assumptions to identify ¯scal policy shocks. In particular it imposes no restric-
tions on the responses of the key variables of interest - GDP, private consumption, real
wages and private non-residential investment - to ¯scal policy shocks. The paper applied
this approach using post war data on the US economy.
We have analyzed three types of policy scenarios: a de¯cit ¯nanced spending in-
crease, a balanced budget spending increase (¯nanced with higher taxes) and a de¯cit
¯nanced tax cut, in which revenues increase but government spending stays unchanged.
We found that a de¯cit spending scenario stimulates the economy for the ¯rst 4 quarters
but only weakly compared to that for a de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut. We also found that both
types of spending scenario had the e®ect of crowding out investment.
Although the best ¯scal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be de¯cit-
¯nanced tax cuts, we wish to point out that this should not be read as endorsing them.
This paper only points out that unanticipated de¯cit-¯nanced tax cuts work as a (short-
lived) stimulus to the economy, not that they are sensible. The resulting higher debt
burdens may have long-term consequences which are far worse than the short-term in-
crease in GDP, and surprising the economy may not be good policy in any case. These
normative judgements require theoretical models for which the empirical positive results
in this paper can provide a useful starting point.
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A VARs and impulse matrices




BiYt¡i + ut ;t = 1;::::T; E[utu
0
t] = §
where Yt are m £ 1 vectors, L is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are m £ m coe±cient
matrices and ut is the one step ahead prediction error.
The problem of identi¯cation is to translate the one step ahead prediction errors,
ut, into economically meaningful, or `fundamental', shocks, vt. We adopt the common
assumptions in the VAR literature that there are m fundamental shocks, which are mu-
tually orthogonal and normalized to be of variance 1. Thus E[vtv0
t] = Im. Identi¯cation
of these shocks amounts to identifying a matrix A, such that ut = Avt and AA0 = §. The
jth column of A represents the immediate impact, or impulse vector, of a one standard
error innovation to the jth fundamental innovation, which is the jth element of v. The
following de¯nition is useful, and new.
De¯nition 1 An impulse matrix of rank n is a n £ m sub-matrix of some m £ m
matrix A, such that AA0 = §. An impulse vector a is an impulse matrix of rank 1,
i.e. is a vector a 2 Rm such that there exists some matrix A; where a is a column of A;
such that AA0 = §.
One can show that the identi¯cation does not depend on the particular matrix A
chosen beyond a given impulse matrix, i.e. a given impulse matrix uniquely identi¯es
the fundamental shocks corresponding to it:
Theorem 1 Suppose that § is regular. Let a given impulse matrix [a(1);:::;a(n)] of size
n be a submatrix of two m£m matrices A, ~ A with AA0 = ~ A ~ A0 = §. Let vt = A¡1ut; ~ vt =




t resp. ~ v
(1)
t ;:::; ~ v
(n)
t be the entries in vt resp. ~ vt corresponding
to a(1);:::;a(n), i.e., if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, then v
(1)
t is the third entry of
vt. Then, v
(i)
t = ~ v
(i)
t for all i = 1;:::;n.
Proof: W.l.o.g., let [a(1);:::;a(n)] be the ¯rst n columns of A and ~ A. If this is e.g.
not the case for A and if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, one can ¯nd a permutation
matrix P so that the given impulse matrix will be the ¯rst n columns of ^ A = AP with
22a(1) the ¯rst column of ^ A. Since PP 0 = I, ^ A ^ A0 = §. Furthermore, the ¯rst column of P
is the vector e3, which is zero except for a 1 in its third entry: hence the ¯rst entry of
^ A¡1ut = P 0vt must be the third entry of vt and thus be v
(1)
t corresponding to a(1).





t ]0 = EnA¡1ut. We need to show that EnA¡1ut = En ~ A¡1ut for all ut.
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In the VAR literature identi¯cation usually proceeds by identifying all m fundamen-
tal shocks and so characterizing the entire A matrix. This requires imposing m(m¡1)=2
restrictions on the A matrix. This is done either by assuming a recursive ordering of
variables in the VAR, so that a Cholesky decomposition of A can be used, see Sims
(1986), or by imposing the m(m ¡ 1)=2 restrictions via assumed short run structural
relationships as in Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Watson(1986), via assumed long
run structural relationships, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989) or via both assumed short
run and long run structural relationships as in Gali (1992).
This paper instead extends the method of Uhlig (2005) and identi¯es at most three
fundamental shocks and so needs to characterize an impulse matrix [a(1);a(2);a(3)] of rank
3 rather than all of A. This is accomplished by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse







t corresponding to a(1);a(2) and a(3) is zero, i.e. that these fundamental
shocks are orthogonal.
To that end, note that any impulse matrix [a(1);:::;a(n)] can be written as the
product [a(1);:::;a(n)] = e AQ of the lower triangular Cholesky factor e A of § with an
n £ m matrix Q = [q(1);:::;q(n)] of orthonormal rows q(i), i.e. QQ0 = In: this follows
from noting that e A¡1A must be an orthonormal matrix for any decomposition AA0 = §
of §. Likewise, Let a = a(s), s 2 f1;:::;ng be one of the columns of the impulse matrix
and q = q(s) = e A¡1a(s) be the corresponding column of Q: note that q(s) does not depend
on the other a(p), p 6= s. As in Uhlig (2005), it follows easily that the impulse responses
for the impulse vector a can be written as a linear combination of the impulse responses
23to the Cholesky decomposition of § as follows. De¯ne rji(k) as the impulse response
of the jth variable at horizon k to the ith column of e A; and the m dimensional column
vector ri(k) as [r1i(k);:::;rmi(k)]. Then the m dimensional impulse response ra(k) at





(where qi is the i-th entry of q = q(s)), delivering equation (??).
De¯ne the function f on the real line per f(x) = 100x if x ¸ 0 and f(x) = x
if x · 0. Let sj be the the standard error of variable j. Let JS;+ be the index set of
variables, for which identi¯cation of a given shock restricts the impulse response to be
positive and let JS;¡ be the index set of variables, for which identi¯cation restricts the
impulse response to be negative. To impose the additional identifying inequality sign
restrictions beyond the zero restrictions of equation (3), we solve
a = argmina= e Aqª(a) (2)


















Computationally, we implement this minimization, using a simplex algorithm: it is avail-
able on many statistical packages as e.g. MATLAB and RATS; for this paper we use
the version of the algorithm written in GAUSS by Bo Honore and Ekaterini Kyriazidou,
available from http://www.princeton.edu/ honore/.
Note that `zero' restrictions, where the impulse responses of the j-th variable to an
impulse vector a for, say, the ¯rst four periods are set to zero, can be incorporated into
the analysis fairly easily. These restrictions can be written as a restriction on the vector
q that
0 = Rq (3)











To identify an impulse matrix [a(1);a(2)], where the ¯rst shock is a business cycle
shock and the second shock is a ¯scal policy shock, ¯rst identify the business cycle shock
24a(1) = e Aq(1) in the manner described above and then identify the second shock a(2) by
replacing the minimization problem 2 with
a = argmina= e Aq;Rq=0;q0q(1)=0ª(a) (5)
i.e. by additionally imposing orthogonality to the ¯rst shock. The two restrictions
Rq = 0;q0q(1) = 0 can jointly be written as
0 = e Rq (6)
where e R0 = [q(1);R0]. Likewise, if orthogonality to two shocks - the business cycle shock
and the monetary policy shock - is required, identify the business cycle shock a(1) = e Aq(1)
and identify the monetary policy shock a(2) = e Aq(2) and solve
a = argmina= e Aq;Rq=0;q0q(1);q0q(2)=0ª(a) (7)
Given the above we can now state our identi¯cation restrictions more formally. We
only provide two: the others follow the same pattern.
De¯nition 2 A business cycle shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that
minimizes a criterion function ª(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of GDP,
private consumption, nonresidential investment and government revenue at horizons k =
0;1;2; and 3.
De¯nition 3 A basic government revenue shock impulse vector is an impulse
vector a minimizing a criterion function ª(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses
to the vector a of government revenue at horizons k = 0;1;2; and 3.
The computations are performed, using a Bayesian approach as in Uhlig (2005),
see also Sims and Zha (1998). We take a number of draws from the posterior. For each
draw from the posterior of the VAR coe±cients and the variance-covariance matrix §,
the shocks are identi¯ed using the criteria described above. Given the sample of draws
for the impulse responses, con¯dence bands can be plotted.
B The Data
All the data we use is freely available from the World Wide Web. The data on components
of US national income is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
which are made publically available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis on their website
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm. The monetary data - the interest rate, producer
commodity price index and adjusted reserves - and the real wage data, is taken from the
Federal Reserve Board of St Louis' website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
25B.1 De¯nitions of Variables in the VAR
All the components of national income are in real per capita terms and are transformed
from their nominal values by dividing them by the gdp de°ator (NIPA table 7.1 Row
4) and the population measure (NIPA table 2.1 Row 35). The table and row numbers
refers to the organization of the data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
GDP: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Private Consumption: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Total Government Expenditure: This is `Federal Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures', NIPA table 3.7 Row 4, plus `Federal Non Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures', NIPA table 3.7 Row 15, plus `State and Local Consumption Expenditures',
NIPA table 3.7 Row 28. plus `Federal Defense Gross Investment', NIPA table 3.7
Row 11, plus `Federal Non Defense Gross Investment ', NIPA table 3.7 Row 24,
plus `State and Local Gross Investment', NIPA table 3.7 Row 35.
Total Government Revenue9: This is `Total Government Receipts', NIPA table 3.1
Row 1, minus `Net Transfers Payments', NIPA table 3.1 Row 8, and `Net Interest
Paid', NIPA table 3.1 Row 11.
Real Wages: This is `Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour' Series
COMPRNFB from the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Private Non-Residential Investment: This is `Nominal Gross Private Domestic
Investment', NIPA table 1.1 Row 6,.minus private residential investment, NIPA
table 1.1 Row 11.
Interest Rate: This is the Federal Funds rate which is the series fedfunds at the
Federal Reserve Board of St Louis' website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/. We take
the arithmetic average of the monthly ¯gures for the Federal Funds Rate.
Adjusted Reserves: This is the Adjusted Monetary Base given by the series adjressl
series at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis' website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ¯gures to get a quarterly ¯gure.
9 This de¯nition follows Blanchard and Perotti (1999) in regarding transfer payments as negative
taxes. We use this de¯nition in order not to obscure the implications of the new identi¯cation technique
used in this paper, by using di®erent data.
26PPIC: This the Producer Price Index of Crude Materials given by the series ppicrm
at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis' website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ¯gures to get a quarterly ¯gure.
The GDP De°ator: This is NIPA table 7.1 Row 4.
The VAR system consists of these 10 variables at quarterly frequency from 1955(Q1)
to 2000(Q4), has 6 lags, no constant or time trend, and uses the logarithm for all variables
except the interest rate where we have used the level.
The ¯scal variable are chosen so that they will have di®erent responses to business
cycle movements and ¯scal policy shocks. The government expenditure variable is chosen
so as to exclude expenditures which will vary over the business cycle such as transfer
payments, see for example Blanchard (1997) p 600 on this. The government receipts
variable should clearly respond positively to a business cycle shock, an increase in output
should increase tax receipts and reduce transfer payments.
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Figure 1: The shocks identi¯ed by the VAR: The business cycle shocks is identi¯ed ¯rst
¯rst, the monetary policy shocks is identi¯ed second and the government revenue and
government spending shocks are identi¯ed third. The shaded areas represent NBER
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Figure 2: The business cycle shock ordered ¯rst. The shaded areas indicate the impulses
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Figure 3: The monetary policy shock ordered second. The shaded areas indicate the
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Figure 4: The basic government revenue shock, identi¯ed by orthogonality to the business
cycle shock and monetary policy shock as well as a positive impulse response function
of government revenues for four quarters after the shock. The restriction is indicated by
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Figure 5: The announced or anticipated basic government revenue shock, identi¯ed by
orthogonality to the business cycle shock and monetary policy shock as well as a zero
impulse response for the ¯rst four quarters and a positive impulse response function for
the next four quarters of government revenues. The restriction is indicated by the shaded
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Figure 6: A comparison of the median responses of an anticipated - solid line - and
unanticipated - dashed line - government revenue shock, where the impulses are plotted
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Figure 7: The basic government expenditure shock, identi¯ed by orthogonality to the
business cycle shock and monetary policy shock as well as a positive impulse response
function of government expenditures for four quarters after the shock. The restriction is

















0 5 10 15 20 25


















0 5 10 15 20 25


















0 5 10 15 20 25


















0 5 10 15 20 25


















0 5 10 15 20 25
















0 5 10 15 20 25















0 5 10 15 20 25
















0 5 10 15 20 25
















0 5 10 15 20 25


















0 5 10 15 20 25
Quarters After the Shock
GDP DEFLATOR 
Figure 8: The announced or anticipated basic government expenditure shock, identi¯ed
by orthogonality to the business cycle shock and monetary policy shock as well as a zero
impulse response for the ¯rst four quarters and a positive impulse response function for
the next four quarters of government expenditures. The restriction is indicated by the
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Figure 9: A comparison of the median responses of an anticipated - solid line - and
unanticipated - dashed line - government spending shock, where the impulses are plotted
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Figure 10: The de¯cit spending policy scenario where government spending is raised by
1% for four quarters with government revenues remaining unchanged. These impulses
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Figure 11: The de¯cit-¯nanced tax cut policy scenario where government spending re-
mains unchanged and government revenue is reduced by 1% for four quarters. These
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Figure 12: The balanced budget policy scenario where government spending is raised
by 1% for four quarters and government revenues raised so that the increased revenue
matches the increased spending. These impulses are linear combinations of a sequence
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Figure 13: The present value of the impulses for GDP and the changing ¯scal variable
for the de¯cit spending policy scenario and the de¯cit ¯nanced tax cut policy scenario
which are displayed in Figures 10 and 11.
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